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Review
Becoming Human: A Theory of Ontogeny

Michael Tomasello. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019.
pp. 392.

Benjamin Gregg*
No philosophical question is older than What are we, we humans? Michael Tomasello
contributes a splendid, empirically based answer to this hoary debate in Becoming Human,
with a programmatic subtitle, A Theory of Ontogeny. We humans are an evolved organism
with a capacity to create culture only by means of which we can realize aspects of our
biological selves—and just as our biology can realize aspects of our cultural selves. That
is, our biology evolved in ways that released in us capacities for “culture” that, in turn,
released in us biologically relevant capacities, with “enormous and cascading phenotypic
effects”—but effects “not encoded directly in the genes” (5).
By the term biology Tomasello refers to hereditary regularities of human mental
development that have made human culture possible (and culture in turn has made possible
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certain biological developments, which I specify below). By culture he does not mean any
particular culture or tradition; he refers to the evolved biological capacity for the social
construction of our living communities in ways that form the individuals socialized within
them. Hence the unique ways in which human individuals are capable of cooperatively
coordinating with each other, of deploying our unparalleled cognitive and social capacities.
That deployment displays tremendous diversity at the level of groups, from small bands to
great civilizations.
On this account, human nature might be defined in terms of our participation in
our own evolution—a participation earlier than, and independent of, the ways we have
influenced our germline through consumption patterns based on artificially selected grains
and meats (let alone the ways we may influence our germline in the future by means of
genetic engineering). Tomasello suggests how our genes render us participants—by
cultural means—in our own biological evolution, such that human culture is not something
distinct from biology and evolution but rather something internal to them. In short, we
invoke ourselves culturally from within our own “loop code,” our evolved genes together
with the culture we have constructed over millennia. In this way our species resembles a
kind of recursive loop. Ours is the only such species. Here we have “human nature” if by
that term we mean: that which makes our species unique vis-à-vis even those species with
whom ours is genetically closest: the chimpanzee and the bonobo.
Culture—as the evolved biological capacity for the social construction of
communities in ways that form the individuals socialized within them—is a matter of
cooperation among persons and over time. It is cooperation to a very high degree, within
self-created social structures, in diverse and continuously new forms, in response to various
adaptive challenges.
Culture in this sense coordinates participants synchronously. Socially constructed
norms, conventions, and institutions often are able to generate participants’ commitment
and trust and motivate their practice of fairness. Further, culture transmits, diachronically,
“skills and knowledge to succeeding generations via cooperative processes” such as “active
instruction and conformist learning, resulting in a kind of ‘ratchet effect’ in which cultural
practices and products (including conventions, norms, and institutions) evolve, perhaps
‘improve,’ over historical time” (4).
Tomasello’s question is: “how do human individuals come to the species-unique
cognitive and social abilities necessary for participating in cultural coordination and
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transmission?” (ibid.). In other words, what is so unique about human psychology that it
renders humans unique as a species? I described his answer with the metaphor of a
“recursive loop”: cognition and sociality that emerge only in cultural life. Normal human
ontogeny requires “both the maturation of species-unique cognitive and social capacities
and also individual experience in such things as collaborative and communicative
interactions with others, structured by cultural artifacts such as linguistic conventions and
social norms” (7) and other aspects of a rich cultural ecology.
Tomasello traces these capacities to three developmental pathways. First, the
“maturation of children’s capacities for shared intentionality,” with the emergence of joint
intentionality at round nine months of age,” and then with the “emergence of collective
intentionality at around three years of age” (8). Shared intentionality enables individuals to
meet socioecological challenges through collective agency, thinking and acting as a
collective agent, toward effecting monumental transformation—including the invention of
culture—without losing individual agency. Acting together as a single agent, individuals
“adopt a shared goal,” “adjust performance of their role to coordinate with their partner(s),”
and “share the spoils of their efforts in mutually satisfactory ways” (342).
Second, individual participants learn to grasp and adopt the perspective of other
individuals, leading to a shared perspective whereby different persons can identify the same
(jointly identified or perceived) concern, focus on the same (jointly perceived or identified)
idea (including things not real or not present) or object (including objects not present or
out of sight). A shared perspective can move participants from personal subjectivity to
group intersubjectivity, and to objectivity—as well as to the capacity to represent
something to all participants. With respect to the focus of their attention, a shared
perspective connects, along a horizontal dimension, persons on the same level of social
hierarchy; and along a vertical dimension, persons on different levels of social hierarchy.
Third, “children attempt to executively self-regulate their thoughts and actions not
just individually, as do many primates, but also socially, through their constant monitoring
of the perspectives and evaluation of social partners on the self” (9). For example, in a
voluntary submission of “me” to “we,” “when individuals make a joint commitment and
one of them reneges, the other calls him out not just based on a personal preference but
based on our shared understanding of our collective commitment to the group’s social
norms” (342). Individuals self-regulate their collaborative activity collaboratively.
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I find in this account the origins of the human capacity for morality and,
ultimately, politics: the fact that “these ontogenetic transformations leading to uniquely
human psychology” lead, in the child of six or seven years of age, to someone who
“operates in her culture as a nascent person based on reason and responsibility” (343).
Reason and responsibility are capacities for norming behavior and for meeting standards.
The young child learns individual self-regulation and then, by entering into forms of joint
agency, transforms it into social self-regulation. Here, our shared We self-regulates my Me
and your You. At this stage of life, the child also starts to identify with a “cultural ‘we,’
which, upon internalization, executively self-regulates her and her compatriots’ beliefs and
actions normatively in the direction of collectively accepted group standards of rationality
(reason) and morality (responsibility)” (ibid.). With the question of what my Me and your
You ought to do as co-constituents of our shared We, we have the foundations of what,
through the ages, becomes moral and political force, in endless variety.
In sum, Tomasello locates in our organic nature the pre-history of our sociocultural learning processes. These require social-cognitive conditions independently of
genetic adaptation. Evidently humans cannot be “humans” without the culture that unlocks
the potential of the biological human. Humans construct themselves culturally by drawing
on their biology, and biologically by drawing on their culture. The ability to cooperate and
collaborate—to create culture—confers an evolutionary adaptive advantage: “individuals
who were both capable and motivated to put their heads together with others to
collaborative or form a culture” were “at an adaptive advantage and so proliferated” (5).
But culture exceeds mere advantage: “virtually all of humans’ most remarkable
achievements—from steam engines to higher mathematics—are based on the unique ways
in which individuals are able to coordinate with one another cooperatively, both in the
moment and over cultural-historical time” (4). And even as culture as a group-level
learning process is not distinct from biology, it develops at a velocity much greater than
that of biological evolution, indeed a velocity ever-increasing. No tool is more valuable to
such coordination than language, itself preceded by non-linguistic communication, which
develops from hand gestures. I conclude that the recursive loop that is our species—that
defines our uniqueness, that constitutes human nature, that renders us political beings—
begins with the index finger; it leads to our becoming human. Here I find a lucid and
plausible proposal in response to the philosophical question: What are we, we humans?
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And particularly compelling, I find, is the fact that Tomasello develops it in terms
of ontogeny not ontology, of speculative science not speculative metaphysics.

